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A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the 
reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel 
about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational 
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by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, 
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Imagine two identical workers. One expected a salary increase of 10 percent but
received an increase of only 5 percent. The other received the same 5 percent wage
increase but had not expected an increase. The change in income was the same for
both workers, but the rst worker probably feels less satised. Intuitively, many
people judge outcomes in light of what they expected to happen. In this paper, we
test this particular notion: whether expectations serve as a reference point.
A growing class of theories (e.g., Bell 1985, Loomes & Sugden 1986, Gul 1991,
Shalev 2000, K} oszegi & Rabin 2006, 2007, forthcoming) is built on the idea that
expectations can act as a reference point and these models are able to align empirical
evidence that is hard to reconcile with usual economic assumptions (e.g., Loomes &
Sugden 1987, Heidhues & K} oszegi 2008). But despite their theoretical and intuitive
appeal, models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences are inherently
dicult to test, as expectations are hard to observe in the eld. To sidestep this
problem, we conduct a tightly controlled real-eort experiment. The two main
advantages of our setup are that we know the rational expectations of participants
and that we can exogenously vary these expectations. We are thus able to directly
assess the relevance of theories of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences.
Investigating the importance of expectations helps with answering the key open
question for reference-dependent preferences: what determines the reference point?
Developing an empirically validated theory of where reference points come from is
crucial for disciplining predictions. Otherwise, if the reference point is assumed
case-by-case, models of reference-dependent preferences might explain behavior not
because of their structural assumptions but because of this additional degree of
freedom. Testing expectations as potential candidate for a reference point extends
previous empirical research which has restricted attention mainly to the status quo
or lagged status quo as reference point (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1990, Odean 1998,
Genesove & Mayer 2001).
In our experiment, subjects work on a tedious and repetitive task. After each
1repetition, they can decide whether to continue or to stop working. They get a
piece rate, but receive their accumulated piece rate earnings only with 50 percent
probability, whereas with 50 percent probability they receive a xed payment in-
stead. Which payment subjects receive is determined only after they have made
their choice about when to stop working. The only treatment manipulation is a
variation in the amount of the xed payment.
By changing the xed payment, we vary earnings expectations of our subjects.
Therefore, expectation-based reference-dependent preferences models predict eort
provision to dier between treatments. Intuitively, if a subject's accumulated piece
rate earnings are lower than the xed payment, receiving the piece rates falls short
of his expectations, as he partly expected to get the (higher) xed payment. Loss
aversion1 relative to expectations thus provides an additional incentive for an in-
dividual to work hard, because this closes the gap between possible outcomes and
expectations. Once the accumulated piece rate earnings are higher than the xed
payment, the incentive eect of loss aversion is reversed: now, the subject might
end up with the (lower) xed payment and this possibility reduces the incentive to
exert eort. Reference dependence therefore moves the optimal eort towards the
eort level that equalizes accumulated piece rates and the xed payment. Models
that assume a reference point in expectations thus predict that increasing the size
of the xed payment will tend to increase overall eort, and that the propensity to
stop is especially high when the piece rate earnings equal the xed payment.
By contrast, a canonical model of eort provision with separable utility over
money and eort costs does not predict a treatment dierence. Optimal eort
is determined by setting marginal cost equal to the marginal benet dened by
the piece rate, and the xed payment is irrelevant for both, marginal cost and
marginal benet of eort. This is true independent of the shape of utility over money
and the shape of the cost function, conditional on the assumption of separability.
1Loss aversion means that people dislike an outcome falling short of the reference point|a
\loss"|more than they like an outcome exceeding the reference point|a \gain" (Kahneman &
Tversky 1979).
2Models incorporating reference-dependent preferences but taking the status quo as
the reference point also predict no treatment dierence because the status quo when
entering the experiment is the same for both treatments.
We nd a signicant treatment eect, such that individuals in the high xed
payment treatment work more. The size of the increase in eort provision is large
relative to the treatment manipulation: average earnings increase by about 2 euros
in response to a 4 euro dierence in the xed payment amount across treatments.
We also observe pronounced spikes in the distribution of eort choices, exactly at
the low xed payment amount in the low xed payment treatment, and at the high
xed payment amount in the high xed payment treatment. Moreover, there is no
spike at the high xed payment amount in the low xed payment treatment, and
vice versa. In an additional control treatment, we show that our results are not
driven by a focal-point eect: subjects do not stop at the xed payment anymore
when we keep the salience of the xed payment constant but move the reference
point away from it. Taken together, these ndings support the main predictions of
reference-dependent preferences models with a reference point in expectations.
One specic application of our ndings is to the lively dispute regarding la-
bor supply and transitory wage changes. There is an ongoing controversy whether
the response of labor supply to changes in incentives is consistent with the stan-
dard intertemporal substitution of labor and leisure, or rather with loss aversion
around a daily reference income (e.g., Camerer et al. 1997, Farber 2005, Fehr &
G otte 2007, Farber 2008, Doran 2007, Crawford & Meng 2008). In this literature
the reference point has typically been treated as an unobserved, latent variable.
Most closely related to our paper is the recent study by Crawford & Meng (2008)
who use data on New York City taxi drivers' labor supply to test the theory of
K} oszegi & Rabin (2006). They proxy the rational expectation about a driver's wage
by the average wage earned per week day and nd evidence for income and hours
targeting around this expectation. Because there is no experimental variation, they
address the problem of endogeneity using a structural approach. Our approach is
complementary, in using a tightly controlled laboratory setting that allows us to ob-
3serve expectations directly and vary them exogenously. Our studies nd converging
evidence on the importance of reference points in expectation for eort provision.
We discuss the implications for the labor supply literature in more detail in Section 5.
Also related to our paper is the literature on violations of expected utility theory
in lottery choices, in which some ndings are supportive of a role for expectation-
based reference points (see Bell (1985), Loomes & Sugden (1986, 1987), and Hack
& Lammers (2008) for discussions). Dierent from our paper, this evidence has
mainly come from inconsistencies observed in choices involving relatively complex
combinations of dierent nancial lotteries. Our experiment adds to this literature
by measuring the impact of reference points as expectations in the domain of real
eort choices, rather than lottery decisions. Moreover, it provides corroborating
evidence on the importance of reference points as expectations, based on a simple
and transparent test, where subjects can act in accordance with expected utility
theory simply by ignoring the xed payment.
The paper is organized as follows. Details of the experimental design are ex-
plained in the following section. Section 3 discusses behavioral predictions. Results
are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Design
Our experiment is designed to create an environment that allows measuring behavior
and expectations and in which we can exogenously vary rational expectations. In
the experiment, subjects worked on a tedious task. As the work task we chose
counting the number of zeros in tables that consisted of 150 randomly ordered zeros
and ones. This task does not require any prior knowledge, performance is easily
measurable, and there is little learning possibility; at the same time, the task is
boring and pointless and we can thus be condent that the task entailed a positive
cost of eort for subjects. The task was also clearly articial, and output was of
no intrinsic value to the experimenter. This eliminates any tendency for subjects to
use eort in the experiment as a way to reciprocate for any incentives oered by the
4experimenter.
The experiment involved two stages. Prior to the rst stage, subjects read the
instructions and answered control questions.2 They knew that a second stage would
follow but had no more details about the second stage. During the rst stage,
subjects had four minutes to count as many tables as possible. They received a
piece rate of 10 cents per correct answer for sure.3 This part served to familiarize
subjects with the task; due to this rst stage, subjects had a good understanding of
how dicult the task was and how much one could earn in a given time before they
knew the amount of the xed payment (which was revealed only after the rst stage).
Additionally, we will use performance in this stage as a productivity indicator.
After the rst stage, subjects read the instructions for the second (and main)
stage. The task was again to count zeros, but there were two dierences compared
to the rst stage. First, they could now decide themselves how much and for how
long they wanted to work. At most, they could work for 60 minutes. When they
wanted to stop, they could push a button on the screen and the experiment was
over: subjects got paid immediately, answered a very short questionnaire, and could
leave. How much subjects chose to work will be the main outcome variable in our
analysis of the experiment. The second dierence was that subjects did not get their
accumulated piece rates of the main stage for sure. Before they started counting
in the main stage, they had to choose one of two closed envelopes. They knew
that one of the envelopes contained a card saying \Acquired earnings" and that the
other envelope contained a card saying \3 euros." But they did not know which
card was in which envelope. The envelopes remained with the subjects while they
were working and were only opened after the subject had stopped working. The
subject's payment was then determined by the card in the chosen envelope. The
piece rate per correct answer was doubled to 20 cents in the main stage in order to
2For an English translation of the instructions, see Appendix A.
3In both stages, if an answer was not correct, subjects had two more tries for the same table.
To prevent guessing, the piece rate was deducted from their account if they failed all three tries.
This happened only 45 times in the experiment (vs. almost 8000 correctly counted tables).
5keep economic incentives comparable between the two stages.
We know the rational expectation of each subject when they were deciding
whether to stop working: with 50 percent probability the subject would receive
the accumulated piece rate earnings and with 50 percent he would receive the xed
payment. Because uncertainty about the payment was revealed only after the work
was nished, we were able to exogenously vary a subject's rational expectation by
changing the amount of the xed payment.
There were two main treatments. The only dierence between these treatments
was the amount of the xed payment. In the LO-treatment, the xed payment
was 3 euros while it was 7 euros in the HI-treatment. Treatments were assigned
randomly to subjects; we also randomized treatments over morning and afternoon
time slots and over days of the week.
A potential confound could have arisen if subjects worked in the same room and
simultaneously started working, e.g., due to peer eects (Falk & Ichino 2006) or
due to a desire for conformity (Bernheim 1994). We employed a special procedure
to prevent such eects: subjects arrived for the experiment one at a time, and
individual starting times were at least 20 minutes apart. Upon arrival, subjects
were guided to one of three essentially identical, neutral rooms.4 They worked alone
in their room with the door closed and never (with very few exceptions) saw another
subject or the other two experimental rooms. Instructions and payments were also
administered in their room. Because of this special procedure, subjects' stopping
behavior could not have been inuenced by other subjects' behavior in a systematic
way.
We also conducted an additional control treatment to check whether the salience
of \3 euros" and \7 euros" could have driven behavior in the two main treatments.
It could be that subjects pay attention to environmental cues to decide when to
stop.5 \3 euros" and \7 euros" were mentioned several times in the instructions
4Photos of the three rooms are shown in Appendix B.
5Focal points or arbitrary anchors have been shown to inuence behavior by, e.g., Tversky
& Kahneman (1974), Mehta et al. (1994), Jacowitz & Kahneman (1995), Chapman & Johnson
6and on the computer screen and could thus have served as a focal point. The
procedure of the control treatment (called SAL for salience) was identical to the
LO-treatment: subjects came one by one, they counted zeros in tables after choosing
one of two envelopes, and the card in their chosen envelope determined their payo
when they decided to stop working. The only dierence was the two cards. In the
LO-treatment, the two cards read \Acquired earnings" and \3 euros." In the SAL-
treatment, however, the cards read \Acquired earnings" and \Acquired earnings plus
3 euros." This means that subjects in SAL actually received the accumulated piece
rate for sure and played an additional lottery (0, 3 euros; 0.5). To keep incentives
for a rational, risk neutral subject the same as in the LO-treatment, the piece rate
in the SAL-treatment was reduced to 10 cents (since subjects received the piece
rate only with 50 percent probability in the LO-treatment but got it for sure in the
SAL-treatment). Salience of \3 euros" remained exactly as in the LO-treatment:
every occurrence of \3 euros" in the original instructions or screens was replaced by
the phrase \acquired earnings plus 3 euros" where applicable. \3 euros" was thus
mentioned equally often and at the same places as in the LO-treatment.
Subjects were students from the University of Bonn studying various majors
except Economics. We recruited subjects who had participated in no or only a
few previous experiments. Experiments were computerized using the software z-
Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 180 subjects participated in the experiment, 60 in each
treatment. No subject participated in more than one treatment. In addition to their
earnings from the two stages of the experiment, subjects received a show-up fee of
5 euros. On average, subjects earned 13.70 euros (about 18.40 USD at the time of
the experiment). The experiment took about one hour on average, including time
for instructions and both stages.
(1999), and Whynes et al. (2005).
73 Predictions
We examine, in turn, the predictions of three dierent types of models: a canoni-
cal model with separable utility, models with status-quo reference dependence, and
models with expectation-based reference dependence. Formally, the setup of our
experiment can be described as follows. The choice variable of subjects is the num-
ber of correctly solved tables e. With probability 1
2, the subject receives a xed
payment f, otherwise, he gets the accumulated piece rate earnings we, where w > 0
is the piece rate per table. c(e) is the cost of eort with @c=@e > 0 that the subject
has to bear in both states of the world. We are interested in the eect of the size
of f on eort provision. In the two main treatments, LO and HI, f is set to fLO
and fHI, respectively.6
First, consider a standard model of eort provision with a utility function sep-
arable in monetary payo x and the cost of eort: U(x;e) = u(x)   c(e). In our



















The optimal eort level e is independent of the xed payment f because in the
state of the world where the subject receives the xed payment f, he wants to stop
right away, independent of the amount of the xed payment. And in the state of the
world where he gets the accumulated earnings, the xed payment does not matter
either. Although linear utility would be the most reasonable assumption for the
stake sizes in the experiment, this result also holds if the subject is risk-averse, or
risk-loving. The shape of the cost function also has no inuence. This prediction,
however, depends on the separability of money and cost of eort.7
6As it happened only very rarely that a subject miscounted a table thrice and thus got the
piece rate deducted from his earnings, we ignore this design detail in the predictions.
7Lifting the assumption of separability, it is conceivable that some or all of the predictions listed
below can be derived without assuming reference dependence explicitly. It is not straightforward,
8Models incorporating reference-dependent preferences but taking the status quo
as the reference point also predict no treatment dierence. The reason is that the
status quo when entering the experiment is the same for both treatments and thus
independent of f. A similar argument holds for any other reference point that is
constant across treatments. This includes lagged expectations, i.e., expectations
about earnings that subjects might have had, before showing up for the experiment
and learning about the actual incentive scheme for their particular treatment.
In contrast to predictions made by the two previous models, theories in which
agents have expectation-based reference-dependent preferences predict dierent be-
havior across treatments. In these models, individuals compare outcomes to their
expectation and dislike an outcome falling short of expectations. We derive four
testable hypotheses using the model of K} oszegi & Rabin (2006, 2007), but the mod-
els by Bell (1985), Loomes & Sugden (1986), and Gul (1991) generate similar pre-
dictions.8
In the model of K} oszegi & Rabin (2006), an individual derives \consumption util-
ity" from the level of the consumption bundle c. As the outcomes in our setup are not
very large, we assume the consumption utility to be linear, m(c) = c. Additionally,
the individual derives \gain-loss utility" from comparing c to a reference bundle r.
Overall utility is the sum of consumption and gain-loss utility. Both consumption
utility and gain-loss utility are assumed to be separable across K dimensions. The
gain-loss utility is dened by n(ckjrk) = (ck   rk), i.e., a function of the dierence
between the intrinsic consumption utilities of the realized outcome and the reference
outcome. For small arguments s, K} oszegi & Rabin assume that (s) is piece-wise
linear: (s) = s for s  0 and (s) = s for s < 0 with   0 and  > 1. The
fact that  is strictly greater than 1 captures loss aversion: losses loom larger than
however, to construct such a model which is at the same time not completely ad hoc. We therefore
don't pursue this possibility further.
8The main dierence between K} oszegi & Rabin (2006) and the other theories is how expec-
tations are mapped into a reference point. Bell (1985), for example, assumes it to be the mean
while K} oszegi & Rabin (2006) assume that an outcome is compared to the entire distribution of
expectations; but this distinction does not matter for our setup.
9equal-sized gains. Since we conduct a real eort experiment, it is natural to assume
that subjects assess outcomes along K = 2 dimensions: money and eort/leisure.
The reference outcome r is the full distribution of rational expectations, i.e., every
outcome that could have happened weighted with its ex-ante probability. Gain-loss
utility in a given state of the world is thus determined by comparing the outcome
that happened to each of the outcomes that could have happened.9
If current accumulated earnings are below the xed payment (we < f) and the




























The rst two terms are expected consumption utility: expected earnings, and the
cost of eort the subject has to bear in either state of the world. The remaining,
bracketed terms are the expected gain-loss utility. The rst term in brackets is the
gain-loss utility in the case that the outcome is we. The whole bracket is multiplied
by 1
2, the probability that this outcome actually occurs and by , the strength of gain-
loss utility. Receiving we is compared to we, generating zero gain-loss sensations;
but receiving we while expecting the larger f feels like a loss. That term is thus
multiplied by  > 1. Since the subject expected to receive f with probability 1
2, the
term is weighted accordingly. The second bracketed term shows gain-loss utility in
the case that the outcome is the xed payment. There is zero gain-loss utility from
comparing f to itself, but receiving f feels like a gain compared to the lower we.
The cost of eort never shows up in the gain-loss utility as the subject decides after
each table whether to continue or to stop working. Thus the expected cost of eort
9In its full generality, the model assumes that a stochastic outcome F is evaluated according to
its expected utility, with the utility of each outcome being the average of how it feels relative to
each possible realization of the reference point G: U(FjG) =
RR
u(cjr)dG(r)dF(c). The reference
point G is the probabilistic beliefs the individual held in the recent past about outcomes. We
calculate what K} oszegi & Rabin (2007) call the \choice-acclimating personal equilibrium", since
subjects had time to adjust their expectations to the particular incentives faced in the experiment
when they made their decisions to stop working.
10is always the same as the actual cost. There is only uncertainty about the monetary
payo.
If the current accumulated earnings are higher than the xed payment (we  f),
the gain-loss utility changes. Receiving the accumulated earnings now feels like a
gain compared to the lower xed payment (third term), while receiving the xed






















The rst-order conditions are then:






































When accumulated earnings are below f, the marginal returns to eort are higher
than w
2, which is the return to eort in the canonical model without gain-loss utility
(assuming linear u()). This is because stopping would entail a loss if the outcome
turns out to be we rather than f. The pain of this loss more than osets the
potential pleasure of a gain if f is realized, so there is an unambiguous increase
in the return to eort. When the accumulated earnings are above f, the incentive
eect of loss aversion is reversed: loss aversion now reduces the returns to eort
relative to the canonical case, as earnings beyond f can be lost in case the subject
receives the xed payment f. Gain-loss utility thus creates an additional incentive
to exert eort when below the xed payment amount, and reduces the incentive to
work when above the xed payment. Therefore, increasing the xed payment should
increase average eort, since it causes the marginal returns to remain high up to a
higher eort level.
Hypothesis 1: Average eort in the HI-treatment is higher than in the
LO-treatment.
11The discrete drop in the return to eort at the xed payment amount implies that
there is a whole range of cost functions for which stopping exactly at the xed
payment is optimal. Thus, the model predicts clustering of stopping decisions ex-
actly at the xed payment f. The model does not predict that every subject stops
exactly at the xed payment. The probability of subjects stopping will be higher
when accumulated earnings equal the xed payment, but the percentage of subjects
stopping at this amount depends on individuals' cost of eort and the strength of
the potential reference dependence of each individual.
Hypothesis 2: The probability to stop at we = fLO is higher in the LO-
treatment than in the HI-treatment; the probability to stop at we = fHI
is higher in the HI-treatment than in the LO-treatment.
It is conceivable that subjects do not stop at the xed payment because of reference
dependence but because the xed payment is salient. If subjects resort to uninfor-
mative, environmental cues to decide when to stop, they might stop at 3 euros or
7 euros because these amounts are mentioned frequently in the instructions and also
on the computer screens and could serve as a focal point. To exclude this alternative
explanation, we turn to the SAL-treatment, which keeps the salience of the xed
payment exactly the same as in the LO-treatment but moves the reference point
away from it. If behavior in the SAL-treatment is dierent from the LO-treatment,
we can conclude that the treatment dierence between LO- and HI-treatment is due
to reference dependence and not due to salience.
In the SAL-treatment, subjects received either (1
2w)e, or (1
2w)e+fLO with equal
probability (the piece rate was half that in the LO-treatment). In a canonical
model of eort provision with a separable, linear utility function, the SAL-treatment
implies exactly the same incentives as the LO-treatment: U = (we + f)=2   c(e).
Such a model therefore predicts behavior to be the same in SAL- and LO-treatment.
Reference dependence around the status quo also predicts no treatment dierence.
If subjects have expectation-based reference-dependent preferences, as in the






















The rst two terms are expected earnings and expected cost of eort. The third and
fourth terms show expected gain-loss utility. If the subject receives fLO in addition
to the piece rate earnings, this feels like a gain relative to the alternative of only
getting the piece rate earnings (third term). If the subject only receives the piece
rate earnings, this feels like a loss relative to also getting the additional amount fLO
(fourth term).
Total utility now is lower than if the individual did not have reference-dependent
preferences: the loss of fLO is weighted more heavily than the gain of fLO, leading
to a lump-sum reduction in utility. But the rst order condition, c0(e) = w
2, is
the same as for the canonical model with linear utility. In contrast to the main
treatments, subjects in SAL cannot inuence the size of a potential loss by choosing
a particular eort level. Therefore, unlike in the LO-treatment, the model does not
predict a tendency for stopping decisions to cluster at fLO; the return to eort does
not depend on being below or above fLO.
Hypothesis 3: The probability to stop at we = fLO is higher in the
LO-treatment than in the SAL-treatment.
The prediction for how average eort in SAL and LO compare depends on whether
the xed payment in the LO-treatment holds back eort for most subjects or in-
duces more eort for most subjects. Individuals who would stop working at an
earnings level below fLO in the LO-treatment would work even less hard in the
SAL-treatment, because without the motive of avoiding a loss the return to eort
is lower. Individuals who would stop with earnings greater than fLO in the LO-
treatment would work harder in the SAL-treatment, as loss aversion held back their
eort in the LO-treatment; in the SAL-treatment, they can work harder without the
risk of feeling a loss when getting the piece rates.10 If we assume that the average
10Subjects who stopped exactly at fLO in the LO-treatment could work more or less in the
SAL-treatment depending on whether loss aversion reduced or increased their eort in LO.
13absolute impact of loss aversion on individual eort is the same above and below f
we can make the following prediction:
Hypothesis 4: If most subjects in the LO-treatment stop below fLO,
eort provision is lower in the SAL-treatment compared to the LO-
treatment. If most subjects in the LO-treatment work for more than fLO,
average eort provision should be higher in the SAL-treatment.
In summary, the model with reference dependence in expectations generates four
testable predictions regarding treatment dierences. A canonical model of eort
provision with a separable utility function predicts eort to be the same across
the three treatments; status-quo reference dependence also predicts no treatment
dierence.
4 Results
In this section we present results of the experiment. The main variable of interest is
the accumulated earnings at which a subject decided to stop. We start by comparing
the two main treatments, HI and LO, testing Hypotheses 1 and 2; we then turn to
the analysis of the third treatment, SAL, focusing on Hypotheses 3 and 4.
The rst result supports Hypothesis 1:
Result 1: Subjects in the HI-treatment work signicantly more than
subjects in the LO-treatment.
In the LO-treatment with xed payment f = 3 euros, subjects stop working after
accumulating 7:37 euros on average. In the HI-treatment with f = 7 euros, subjects
stop on average at 9:22 euros. The treatment dierence of 1:85 euros is quite large,
almost half the amount of the treatment manipulation (7   3 = 4 euros). The
marginal eect compared to eort provision in the LO-treatment is 25.1 percent.
The treatment dierence in eort provision is signicant in an OLS regression where
we regress the accumulated earnings at which a subject stopped on a treatment
14dummy (see Table 1, column 1).11 The treatment dierence stays signicant when
we control for productivity, gender, outside temperature (experiments took place in
the summer), and time of day. The only signicant control variable is productivity
(Table 1, columns 2 and 3). As an indicator for productivity in the main stage, we use
average time per correct answer in the rst stage (measured in seconds multiplied
by  1). A positive coecient thus indicates that faster subjects complete more
tables. Figure 1 shows that the answering speed is very stable between the two
stages, consistent with performance in the rst stage reecting a stable productivity
characteristic.12
It could be that the cost of eort is not only determined by the number of tables
counted but also by the mere time subjects spend in the experiment. We therefore
consider the time spent working as an alternative measure of eort provision. Treat-
ments are also dierent for this dependent variable: subjects in the LO-treatment
work on average 31:7 minutes, while subjects in the HI-treatment work on average
6:4 minutes longer, a marginal eect of 20.1 percent. This dierence is signicant
in OLS regressions with and without the controls described above (see Table 1,
columns 4 to 6).13 Because subjects can only work between 0 and 60 minutes, we
also present Tobit regressions that account for this censoring (Table 1, columns 7
11The result is conrmed by non-parametric tests. A Mann-Whitney U-test yields a p-value of
0:015 (all p-values in this paper refer to two-sided tests). The same result obtains if we compare
the distribution of stopping decisions: a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the equality
of distributions between treatments (p = 0:005).
12The Spearman rank correlation coecient between stages is 0:520 (p < 0:001). This measure
of productivity is not inuenced by the treatment manipulation since subjects did not know yet
during the rst stage about the exact procedure of the main stage. Consequently, answering speed
in the rst stage is not signicantly dierent between treatments (U-test, p = 0:185). Using average
time per answer (i.e., including also wrong answers) or number of completed tables during the rst
stage instead of the measure used above does not change results. Two subjects who needed 158s
and 201s per table in the rst stage and 46s and 58s in the main stage are not shown in Figure 1,
but are of course included in all analyses. Results are unchanged if we exclude these subjects.
13The treatment dierence in working time is also statistically signicant in non-parametric



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16Figure 1: Average Time per Table During First and Main Stage.
to 9). This does not alter the results.14
As shown in Section 3, the model of K} oszegi & Rabin (2006) predicts that stop-
ping decisions in the two treatments should dier in a very special way. As stated in
Hypothesis 2, the model predicts a higher probability of stopping when the accumu-
lated earnings equal the xed payment. This prediction arises because for a whole
range of marginal cost functions, stopping exactly at the xed payment is the opti-
mal choice. Neither the canonical model, nor the model with status quo reference
dependence, make this prediction. Our data are consistent with Hypothesis 2.
Result 2: The probability to stop when accumulated earnings are equal to
the amount of the xed payment is higher compared to the same earnings
level in the other main treatment. The modal choice in both treatments
is to stop exactly when accumulated earnings equal the xed payment.
Figure 2 shows a histogram of accumulated earnings (LO in the top panel, HI in
the bottom panel). First of all, stopping decisions are dispersed over a wide range.
14Censoring is not an issue if we take earnings as dependent variable; earnings are neither
bounded above nor below (since subjects could make losses by miscounting tables thrice).
17Some subjects stop directly, others work for up to 25 euros. This is what one would
expect given that productivity and cost of eort dier across subjects. But there
are systematic dierences between treatments: in the LO-treatment, many subjects
stop at 3 euros (15.0 percent of subjects); in the HI-treatment, almost nobody stops
at 3 euros (1.7 percent). By contrast, in the HI-treatment many subjects stop at
7 euros (16.7 percent); in the LO-treatment very few subjects stop here (3.3 percent).
The modal choice in both treatments is to stop exactly when accumulated earnings
equal the xed payment. These treatment dierences are statistically signicant.
Results of a multinomial logit regression with the three outcomes \stop at 3 euros",
\stop at 7 euros", and \stop elsewhere" are presented in Table 2. Column 1 shows
the regression without controls, in columns 2 and 3 the controls used in the OLS-
regressions above are added. Being in the HI-treatment leads to signicantly less
stopping at 3 euros and more stopping at 7 euros compared to being in the LO-
treatment.15 The same results obtain if we compare the number of subjects stopping
in a range around 3 and 7 euros.16
We conducted an additional control treatment to check whether the salience of
\3 euros" and \7 euros" could have driven behavior in the two main treatments. The
SAL-treatment keeps the salience of the xed payment exactly the same as in the
LO-treatment but moves the reference point away from it. If behavior in the SAL-
treatment is dierent from the main treatment, we can conclude that the treatment
dierence between LO- and HI-treatment is due to reference dependence and not
due to salience. Moreover, the model with the reference point in expectations makes
a prediction for how behavior should be dierent: in the SAL-treatment, unlike the
other treatments, there should be no special tendency to stop at the amount of the
15These dierences are also signicant in non-parametric tests: the percentages of subjects
stopping at 3 euros is signicantly higher in the LO-treatment (U-test, p = 0:009); the percentage
stopping at 7 euros is higher in the HI-treatment (U-test, p = 0:015).
16Between 2 and 4 euros, 30.0 and 5.0 percent of subjects stop in the LO- and HI-treatment,
respectively (U-test, p < 0:001); between 6 and 8 euros, these gures are 13.3 and 36.7 percent,
respectively (U-test, p = 0:003). Multinomial logit estimates for this result are presented in Table 5
in Appendix C.
18Figure 2: Histogram of Accumulated Earnings (in Euro) at Which a Subject
Stopped.
19xed payment (Hypothesis 3). This is indeed the case.
Result 3: Subjects do not stop at the xed payment anymore when we
keep the salience of the xed payment constant but move the reference
point away from it.
In the SAL-treatment, 3.3 percent of subjects stop at 3 euros compared to 15.0 per-
cent in the LO-treatment. Results of multinomial logit regressions comparing the
LO- and SAL-treatments are shown in Table 3. The dependent variable is again
whether subjects stopped at 3 euros, at 7 euros, or somewhere else. Compared to
the SAL-treatment, subjects in the LO-treatment stop more often at 3 euros but
not at 7 euros.17 This result continues to hold when we include the control variables
mentioned above in the regression. Results of the control treatment therefore show
that subjects in the main treatments do not stop at f because of salience.18
One nal piece of evidence concerning why so many subjects stop exactly at
the xed payment comes from a short questionnaire administered after the two
main treatments. We asked subjects to state reasons for their stopping decision.
Answers were given in free form without suggestion of possible reasons. Of those
subjects stopping exactly when accumulated earnings equal the xed payment, the
great majority named reasons such as a fear of \losing their earnings" when they
worked for more than the xed payment, or that they wanted to \make sure" to
get the amount of the xed payment by working at least that much. Because they
indicate a desire to avoid unfavorable comparisons to what might have happened,
these answers reinforce our behavioral ndings suggesting that reference dependence
and loss aversion drive the clustering of stopping decisions at the xed payment.
17These dierences are also signicant in non-parametric tests (U-test, p = 0:027).
18A potential concern could arise because subjects in the SAL-treatment had to complete 30 ta-
bles to reach the xed payment of 3 euros while subjects in the LO-treatment needed only 15 tables.
If eort costs simply made it impossible to reach 30 tables in the SAL-treatment, this would me-
chanically prevent subjects from stopping exactly at 3 euros. However, 65 percent of subjects in





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Hypothesis 4 predicted the relation of average eort in the SAL- and LO-
treatment to depend on the behavior of subjects in the LO-treatment. Average eort
in SAL should be higher if most subjects in LO stopped at earnings levels above the
xed payment; and average eort should be lower if most subjects stopped below f.
As shown in Figure 2, 75 percent of subject in the LO-treatment stop above the
xed payment of 3 euros and only 10 percent stop below the xed payment. The
number of subjects for whom reference dependence reduces the marginal incentive
to exert eort is therefore much larger than the number of subjects for whom the
marginal incentive is increased. Since the inuence of reference dependence on the
optimal eort choice is removed by design in the SAL-treatment, we should expect
average eort in the SAL-treatment to be higher than in the LO-treatment. This is
what we nd.
Result 4: Subjects in the SAL-treatment work signicantly more than
subjects in the LO-treatment.
Subjects complete 12.4 tables more and work 10.8 minutes longer in the SAL-
treatment compared to the LO-treatment. This amounts to a marginal eect of
34 percent compared to eort in the LO-treatment. Regression analyses show that
this dierence is signicant. Table 4 presents OLS-estimates without and with the
controls described above. For both alternative dependent variables|the number
of tables counted (columns 1 to 3) or the time spent working (columns 4 to 6)|
subjects in the SAL-treatment work signicantly more. The eect on eort provision
is actually underestimated since 30.0 percent of subjects in the SAL-treatment work
the full 60 minutes and are censored compared to 13.3 percent in the LO-treatment.
As a consequence, the coecient of the treatment dummy is slightly larger in To-
bit estimates that take this censoring into account (columns 7 to 9).19 The fact
that subjects work more in the SAL-treatment is in line with reference dependence
holding back eort in the main treatments. Once we eliminate the (low) reference
19The treatment dierences are also signicant in non-parametric tests (tables completed: U-
test, p = 0:005; two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0:018. Time spent working: U-test,
p < 0:001; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0:003).
23point, subjects increase eort provision drastically, even beyond the level found in
the HI-treatment.
5 Conclusion
In a simple real-eort laboratory experiment, we tested theories of reference-
dependent preferences that assume the reference point to be a function of indi-
vidual expectations. A canonical model with separable utility and models with the
status-quo as the reference point fail to explain the treatment dierences, whereas
the results are as predicted by models with the reference point in expectations. An
additional treatment ruled out an alternative explanation based on salience. Our
results thus contribute to understanding what determines the reference point. They
support models which assume the reference point to be formed by expectations, like
Bell (1985), Loomes & Sugden (1986), Gul (1991), or K} oszegi & Rabin (2006).
Our results are also relevant for the literature on reference points and labor
supply. Studies in this literature use eld data on worker eort choices, and have
contributed to a lively debate regarding whether the response of eort to changes
in incentives is consistent with the standard intertemporal substitution of labor
and leisure or rather with loss aversion around a daily reference income. In this
literature the reference point has typically been treated as an unobserved, latent
variable. Camerer et al. (1997) demonstrated that the daily labor supply of NYC
cab drivers is in line with loss aversion around a daily income target. Farber (2005)
raised the important point that daily earnings vary too much to be explained by
a xed daily income target. Partly in response to this evidence, K} oszegi & Rabin
(2006) developed a theory of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences that
allows the income target to dier in a predictable way across days. Our experiment
adds to this literature by making the rational expectations known to the researcher
and by providing exogenous variation while keeping other potential reference points
constant. As noted by K} oszegi & Rabin (2006) and subsequently shown by Crawford
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25expectations, anticipated changes in incentives should not distort behavior relative to
standard theory, given that expectations adjust to reect the anticipated change. For
example, if an individual expects the hourly wage to be low on a given day, earning
a small amount does not feel like a loss. But if the hourly wage is unexpectedly
low, this does feel like a loss relative to expectation, and can induce workers to work
even harder to try to reach their expectation, contrary to the standard prediction on
intertemporal substitution which implies that workers should decrease eort when
the wage is temporarily low. This distinction helps reconcile some of the seemingly
conicting ndings in the eld evidence. Our results are complementary, providing
controlled evidence that expectations can in fact act as a reference point, and can
aect eort provision.
An interesting direction for future research is to distinguish between dierent
expectation-based models of reference-dependent preferences. Our treatments are
not designed to test which way of specifying the reference point in expectations is
the empirically most plausible: assuming that the reference point is the mean of
the expected outcomes (like in Bell 1985, Loomes & Sugden 1986, or Gul 1991) or
assuming that the reference point is the whole distribution of expected outcomes
(like in, e.g., K} oszegi & Rabin 2006, 2007). Both of these assumptions predict
a higher probability to stop when accumulated earnings equal the xed payment.
Our experimental design provides a useful platform for pursuing this question in
the future, however, and could be extended to distinguish between these models: if
subjects' nal payos are determined by a lottery over two distinct xed payments
and accumulated earnings, rather than just one xed payment and accumulated
earnings as in the current study, then predictions are dierent across models. Models
like the one of Loomes & Sugden (1986) predict a higher probability to stop when
accumulated earnings equal the mean of the two xed payments but not when they
equal one of the two xed payments. Models like K} oszegi & Rabin (2006) predict a
higher probability to stop at the two xed payments but not at the mean.
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29A Instructions
Below are the instructions of the LO-treatment translated into English. The only
dierence in the HI-treatment is that every occurrence of \3 euros" is replaced by
\7 euros". In the SAL-treatment, \3 euros" is replaced by \acquired earnings plus
3 euros" where applicable and the piece rate is set to 10 cents.
The experiment consists of two parts. Please start by reading the explanations for
the rst part carefully. You will receive the instructions for the second part of the
experiment after the rst part is nished.
For your arrival on time, you receive 5 euros that will be paid to you at the end
of the experiment. If you have any questions during the experiment please ask the
experimenter. If you use the computer in an improper way you will be excluded
from the experiment and from any payment.
Instructions for the rst part of the experiment
What do you have to do?
In this part of the experiment your task is to count zeros in a series of tables. The
gure shows the work screen you will use later:
30Enter the number of zeros into the box on the right side of the screen. After you
have entered the number, click the OK-button. If you enter the correct result, a
new table will be generated. If your input was wrong, you have two additional tries
to enter the correct number into the table. You therefore have a total of three tries
to solve each table.
If you entered the correct number of zeroes you earn money: You receive 10 cents
for each table you solved correctly.
If you enter three times a wrong number for a table, 10 cents will be subtracted
from your earnings and a new table will then be generated. The earnings of this
part of the experiment will be paid to you at the end of the experiment.
Example: You solve three tables correctly; you miscount one table once. You
miscount a fourth table three times. Your earnings are therefore:
3 x 10c for the correctly counted tables
- 1 x 10c for the fourth table, which you miscounted three times.
thus a total of 20c.
You have 4 minutes until the rst part of the experiment is over. The remaining
time is displayed in the upper right hand corner of the screen.
Counting tips: Of course you can count the zeros any way you want. Speaking
from experience, however, it is helpful to always count two zeros at once and multiply
the resulting number by two at the end. In addition you miscount less frequently if
you track the number you are currently counting with the mouse cursor.
Example question
Please answer the following question:
Assume you have solved 5 tables correctly, and miscounted two tables three times.
What are your acquired earnings? euros
After you have answered the example question correctly, the experimenter will start
the rst part of the experiment.
31Instructions for the second part of the experiment
What do you have to do?
The task in this part of the experiment is once again to count zeros in a series of
tables. The gure shows the work screen you will use later:
New rules are now in eect, which did not apply in the rst part:
 For each correctly solved table you will be credited 20 cents. After
three wrong inputs 20 cents will be subtracted from your earnings.
 It is possible to lose the acquired earnings from this part of the experiment:
there are two envelopes in front of you. One envelope contains a card with
the text \acquired earnings", the other contains a card \3 euros". You do
not know which card is in which envelope. Please choose one of the
envelopes now and sign on the envelope.
 While you are working, the envelopes will remain in your room. After you
have nished your task, we will open the envelopes. You are not allowed
to open the envelopes before you have nished your task and one of the
experimenters is with you.
 If you have drawn the envelope with the card \acquired earnings",
you will get your acquired earnings and not the 3 euros.
32 If you have drawn the envelope with the card \3 euros", you will
get 3 euros and not the acquired earnings. The amount of 3 euros does
not change, no matter how many tables you solved.
 After your work is done we will also open the envelope which you did not
choose, such that you can check that the envelopes contained dierent cards.
Important: In this part of the experiment you can count zeros as long as you want.
This means you can decide yourself when you want to stop working. You can work,
however, at most 60 minutes.
If you want to stop counting, please click on the red button \stop working" and
contact us by briey stepping into the corridor. You will be paid in your room.
Example: You stop after ten minutes and have solved 24 tables correctly with no
miscounts. Your acquired earnings are therefore 2420c = 4:80 euros. The envelope
chosen by you contains the card \acquired earnings". You therefore get 4:80 euros.
Example: You stop after 10 minutes and have solved 24 tables correctly with no
miscounts. Your acquired earnings are therefore 4.80 euros. The envelope chosen by
you contains the card \3 euros". You therefore get 3 euros instead of the 4:80 euros.
Example: You stop after 30 minutes and have solved 4 tables correctly and
miscounted three times at a 5th table. Your acquired earnings are therefore
4  20c   1  20c = 60c. The envelope chosen by you contains the card \3 eu-
ros". You therefore get the amount of 3 euros instead of your acquired earnings of
60c.
Example questions
Please answer the following questions:
Assume you have solved 28 tables correctly within 20 minutes.
 What are your acquired earnings? euros
 How much money do you get if the envelope chosen by you contains the card
\acquired earnings"? euros
 How much money do you get if the envelope chosen by you contains the card
\3 euros"? euros
Assume you have solved 7 tables correctly within 15 minutes.
33 What are your acquired earnings? euros
 How much money do you get if the envelope chosen by you contains the card
\acquired earnings"? euros
 How much money do you get if the envelope chosen by you contains the card
\3 euros"? euros
After you have answered the example questions correctly, the experimenter will start
the second part of the experiment.
34B Photos of Experimental Rooms
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